Peasant National Consciousness is Old Gat

Nations, by Azar Gat, Alexander Yakobson (Contributor). 2013

Nations and Nationalism Go Back to Antiquity: They are Not Recent Inventions! Early Peasant National Consciousness Demonstrated

This work presents a series of fascinating, myth-shattering information, and I focus on some of it.

THE REIGNING BIASES AGAINST THE RECOGNITION OF THE ANCIENT ORIGINS OF NATIONS AND NATIONALISM

Author Azar Gat thus explains, “Both liberalism and Marxism [and cultural Marxism], the dominant social theories and ideologies of our times, lack the conceptual frameworks within which lie the deeper roots of ethnicity and nationalism can be comprehended. Famously, what one cannot conceptualize one does not see; even if it is an elephant in the room. Furthermore, it is probably not a coincidence that the pioneering modernist theorists—Kohn, Deutsch, Gellner, Hobsbawn—were all Jewish immigrants from central Europe (and Elie Kedourie from the Middle East) during the first half of the twentieth century.” (p. 16). Gat blames their bad experiences with nationalism for their beliefs that nations and nationalism are recent inventions. (pp. 16-17).

SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL, NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND NATIONALISM HAD CENTERED ON ETHNICITY (EXCEPTIONS NOTWITHSTANDING)

Azar Gat recognizes that there are exceptions to the one-state-one-dominant-ethnicity rule (a few conflict-free multi-ethnic states, notably Switzerland: p. 23, 82, 263-264), but this does not negate this rule:

“With major ethnos formation going far back into the Neolithic agricultural and pastoralist expansions, it was immeasurably easier to create and sustain a large state within a common ethnic space which shared language, culture, and a sense of kinship. In turn, state formation itself greatly enhanced the ethnic leveling of the realm and brought about the assimilation of foreign groups.” (p. 128).

“Simply put, it was immeasurably easier to create and sustain a state where bonds and affinities of a common culture and a collective sense of shared kinship existed and could be potently invoked and harnessed. Furthermore, antagonistic tribal populations of close ethnicity often gained their sense of common identity and crystallized into nascent nations and states only as a result of the challenge and pressure from foreign neighbors, who sometimes even gave them their communal names.” (p. 212).

“In addition, although they were often highly antagonistic toward one another, city-states of the same ethnos revealed a marked tendency to coalesce into an alliance or a permanent league in the face of exterior rivals.” (p. 128).

“As mentioned previously, states tended to emerge within an ethnic space which shared kin-culture attributes…Most states were built upon a population of common ethnicity and depended on its sense of shared identity, affinity, and solidarity. They centered on a particular majoritarian STAATSVOLK. Such states differed from empires on precisely this point: whereas the former generally remained confined to a specific people (in the main and never pure, of course), the latter expanded beyond their more dependable ethnic core to rule over a larger multiethnic realm.” (p. 83).

“…kin-culture bonds of identity, affinity, and solidarity—which lie at the root of tribalism, ethnicity, and nationalism—will remain a potent social force.” (p. 325).

EARLY NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG PEASANTS

Owing to a lack of records, we cannot know precisely what pre-modern peasants were capable of thinking. (p. 13, 87, 235, 252). Therefore, the longstanding argument that the pre-modern peasant lacked national consciousness is, at best, an argument from ignorance.

The argument is also predicated on the validity of the notion that, prior to the advent of mass education and mass media, there was no way that the common man could acquire a national consciousness. This is certainly incorrect. Gat comments, “Thus, the emphasis on literacy has been largely misleading, because illiterate societies had their own potent means of wide-scale cultural transmission. We have already mentioned the dense network of cultic-clerical centers placed everywhere across a country. Oral epics recited by wandering bards celebrated gods, kings, heroes, and the people—always OURS—served as another major vehicle of cultural dissemination. Their effect on the consolidation of large-scale ‘imagined communities’ [Gat: collective consciousness: p. 17] cannot be overstated. Dances, plays, games, and festivals, often infused with ritualistic significance, were equally influential. Moreover, it is too often forgotten that although the masses in historical state societies were illiterate, they were commonly read to by the literati, and for very distinctive purposes. Such public readers included the state’s agents in public summons…” (p. 12; Emphasis added).

In discussing Serb uprisings, against Ottoman rule, in 1594 and 1727, Gat highlights the early national consciousness of the Serb peasantry, “Together with the Church’s influence, the highly popular patriotic songs (PESMES [Polish: PIESNI]) of the bards played a central role in spurring mass peasant mobilization in this predominantly illiterate society.” (p. 252).

FIRSTHAND PEASANT AWARENESS OF NATIONAL DIFFERENCES

Some preliterate peasants got to develop an “us” and “them” polarity, at the national level,by means of direct personal experience. Gat comments, “In addition, peasants carrying produce for sale in markets or towns, or frequented by traveling traders, were exposed to, and eagerly absorbed, echoes from the outside world. That means their region and province, and also their people, country and state writ large.” (p. 12).

For more on the latter in relation to early peasant national consciousness among Poles, see my review of: THE NATION IN THE VILLAGE.

NOT TRUE THAT “POLISH NATION” ONCE MEANT ONLY THE NOBILITY, AND THAT IT EXCLUDED THE PEASANTS FROM THE POLISH NATION

Azar Gat shatters a long-promoted myth, and does so rather trenchantly, “Indeed, recent trends in the historiography of Poland have turned the tables on the modernists, charging them with the anachronism they attribute to modern nationalists.” (p. 169). Well said!

Gat then cites the detailed research of David Althoen, who showed that at no time did either the term or the concept of NAROD SZLACHECKI exclude peasants from the Polish nation. See:

CLASS CONFLICT PERHAPS INHIBITED, BUT DID NOT PREVENT, THE EXISTENCE OF PRE-LITERATE PEASANT NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

It is sometimes claimed that peasant national consciousness could not exist in a feudal or quasi-feudal society. This is certainly untrue.

To begin with, Gat warns against common overgeneralizations that supposedly imply the peasantry not feeling part of a common collective: “These societies were not all EQUALLY fragmented by class, locality, and dialect.” (p. 13; Emphasis added. See also p. 234).

Thus, it is wrong to make sweeping generalizations such as “peasants were oppressed” and “peasants had no national consciousness because they did not care who oppressed them”. Gat discusses several examples of peasant-centered national uprisings (elaborated below), and concludes that, “Throughout history whole peoples habitually rose in arms to defend or restore their freedom. Since the overwhelming majority of their societies were not democratic and recognized little personal freedom, the collective freedom they desperately aspired to and were willing to pay with their blood and property was obviously freedom from FOREIGN rule. It mattered to people greatly whether or not their rulers—and often their oppressors—were their own.” (p. 235).

The author is even more direct when he concludes that, “There is no question that the people preferred their often hated social superiors to ‘bloody foreigners’.” (p. 172).

EXAMPLES OF PRE-MODERN PEASANT ETHNOPATRIOTISM—ALIAS NATIONALISM (Gat, p. 236).

Not all societies were socially stratified. For instance, the ancient national state of Macedonia relied on mass infantry armies which freely coexisted with the monarch and the aristocracy. (pp. 234-235).

Let us consider a few recent examples of active pre-modern peasant nationalism. The popular Serbian insurrections against Ottoman Turkish rule (p. 252) have already been discussed. Azar Gat cites the popular-patriotic rebellions against foreign Jurchen rule in China. (p. 129, 236). There was also the 17th century Deluge, in which there was a Polish patriotic peasant uprising against the Swedish invaders. (p. 172, 236). This was followed by the peasant-centered Kosciuszko Insurrection of 1794. (p. 173).

THE ETHNIC BASIS OF NATIONS RECOGNIZED FROM ANTIQUITY

In ancient Roman usage, GENS and NATIO signified peoples in contrast to the POPULUS ROMANUS. NATIO had the connotation of littermates, and referred to a peoples purportedly descended from one ancestor. GENS was broader: It had the connotation of a “people” or “nation” independent of homeland or common ancestor. For instance, Tacitus spoke of all Germans as one GENS, but divided them into their various NATIONES. (pp. 216-217).

As for medieval nations, Gat cites medievalist historian Susan Reynolds, who wrote, “‘A kingdom was never thought of merely as the territory which happened to be ruled by a king. It comprised and corresponded to a “people” (GENS, NATIO, POPULUS)…’” (p. 234). On the other hand, politics was superceded by ethnicity. For instance, the Spanish nation was recognized as geographically broader than the region specifically ruled by the King of Castile. Likewise, the French or Gallican nation was understood to encompass Savoy, Burgundy, etc., even though these entities were not then considered part of France as then called. (p. 219).

MODERN NATIONALISM: NO VALID DICHOTOMY BETWEEN SO-CALLED CIVIC NATIONALISM AND ETHNONATIONALISM

Azar Gat realizes that Eastern Europeans [e. g, Poland’s Endeks] have been negatively stereotyped as ethnonationalists, in contrast to the presumably more sophisticated and enlightened civic nationalism of the west. (p. 331). Gat then shatters this myth.

Consider France, the prototype of civic nationalism. In fact, the French have always been a nation that rejects challenges to its Francophone and secular character. (p. 262). Switzerland, a rare stable multiethnic nation, has always opposed the naturalization of foreign residents. (p. 263).

The United States, professing civic nationalism, also rests on ethnonationalism upon close examination. It has always been an Anglocentric culture, with foreigners expected to assimilate to it, and usually being happy to do so (the melting pot model). (pp. 270-271). Now, with multiculturalism (and illegal immigration), there are conflicts with the newcomers to American Anglocentric ethnonationalism.

In conclusion, virtually all nations rest upon ethnonationalism! Azar Gat concludes, “Undoubtedly, all nations have a strong civic element, and there are various mixes and balances here, but very few nations do not rely on a sense of shared kin-culture identity as the basis for civic cooperation.” (p. 263). In fact, “…all the liberal states do in fact give preference to a particular ethnicity, their own, as reflected most notably in the standard language; all are engaged in nation-building.” (p. 279).