German Guilt Diffusion Bystander Holocaustspeak Confronted Polonsky

Jews in Poland and Russia: A Short History, by Antony Polonsky. 2013

“Bystander” is Orwellian: German Guilt Diffusion. Understanding Collaboration. 1912 Duma Elections Refreshing Objectivity. Jewish Anti-Assimilation Many Reasons. Not Only Endeks Objected to Jewish Separatist Conduct

This encyclopedic work covers a wide range of topics. Owing to the breadth of the information presented, I focus only on a few topics.

HOLOCAUSTSPEAK TERMS SERVE THE PURPOSE OF GERMAN GUILT DIFFUSION

Polonsky objects to the widely used term bystander because of the brutalities of the German occupation. In addition, bystander implies free choice, and furthermore serves to lessen German guilt, even if unintentionally. (p. 331). Well said!

LOCALS’ DENUNCIATIONS AND KILLINGS OF JEWS WERE NOT BLACK AND WHITE

During the early part of Operation Barbarossa, some Slavs and Balts joined in the murders of Jews. While not exonerating people of responsibility for their actions (p. 332), Polonsky appreciates the fact that the these peoples were under very brutal German rule. (p. 331).

Going further, Polonsky has a lucid and detailed analysis of Nazi collaboration. Collaboration could variously be motivated by agreement with Nazi racial goals, by an outworking of fascist sympathies, by an attempt to make the best of a bad situation, or by an attempt to alleviate the sufferings of one’s people until there is an Allied victory. Applying this, he then focuses on the conduct of the Judenrate in considerable detail. (pp. 357-on). However, the most important thing is not to create a double standard for Jewish collaboration and non-Jewish collaboration. In addition, one must derive a clear definition of what it is to be “complicit in the Holocaust”, whatever that means.

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EXCUSES FOR JEWISH ANTI-ASSIMILATION DO NOT HOLD UP

Owing to the fact that assimilation is an amorphous term, integration is probably the better term to use. Polonsky repeats the usual explanations (or exculpations) for Jews not integrating with Poland: The Catholic-majoritarian atmosphere and absence of pluralism, the persistence of anti-Semitism, the non-granting of full civil rights, etc. Not quite.

Was the granting of full rights to Jews a condition for Jews agreeing to join Poland, or should it be the other way around? (p. 67). As for continued anti-Semitism, some integrationist-oriented Jews, such as Samuel Hirsch Peltyn, the editor of IZRAELITA, contended that no nation is perfect. Jews should not think that their loyalty to, and unity with, a nation should occur towards a nation that exists only in dreams. (p. 108).

Other factors inhibited the integration of Jews into Polish society. The Jewish community was very slow to change. (p. 75, 109). Polish positivists had long believed that socio-economic progress and secular public schooling would break down the barriers between Poles and Jews. (p. 75, 109). However, economic progress was slow, and the tsarist Russian authorities forbade the establishment of public schools. (p. 109). In 1900, the vast majority of Poland’s Jews were still being educated in the HEDER. (p. 109). [In 1918, with the impending resurrection of the Polish state, Jews demanded special government-funded Jewish schools as part of the minority rights of Jews.]

Finally, many/most Jews, notably the nationalist-oriented ones, opposed integration into Polish society for a very simple reason. They felt that they would have to give up essential aspects of Jewishness in doing so! (p. 100).

Conclusion: Do not blame the Jewish resistance to assimilation only on Poles.

1912 DUMA ELECTIONS: NO JEWISH GOOD GUYS AND POLISH BAD GUYS

One of the most interesting aspects of this work is Polonski’s relatively balanced treatment of these elections, and the ensuing retaliatory Endek-led boycott of Jews. This is instead of the usual one-sided demonization of Roman Dmowski.

The Jewish electorate, most of which was unassimilated, had this platform: One seat for the Duma, from the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland (preferably from Lodz, but, if necessarily from Warsaw), would be held by a Jew. Otherwise, in Warsaw, the Pole elected would be one who supports “equal rights for Jews” (as they defined it). (p. 115). It is fascinating to note that assimilationist Jews, writing in IZRAELITA, saw through this seemingly reasonable demand (and tacitly agreed with the Endek condemnation of it)! Polonsky comments, (quote) IZRAELITA rejected this platform as unnecessarily provocative. “Warsaw is a Polish city. The Jews must not take advantage of their accidental voting majority…they must vote for a man of tested civic virtues, for a fervent Polish patriot. A manifestation of Jewish separatism must not be allowed to take place.” (unquote). (p. 115).

One common reason (or exculpation) for the Jews supporting the socialist Jagiello, instead of Jan Kucharzewski, in the 1912 elections to the Duma, was the alleged anti-Semitism of the latter. In actuality, Kucharzewski publicly declared his support of the principle of Jewish equal rights, although he also felt that some restrictions on Jewish political and economic power would have to exist, and that Jewish aloofness to the Polish cause was factual. (p. 115). Then again, the anti-Semitism accusation is always a very handy one to make.

JEWS AS SCAPEGOATS–YET AGAIN

I dispute Polonsky’s contention that Dmowski, as suggested by Kucharzewski, was too conciliatory to the Russians, and that Dmowski made anti-Jewish appeals because he felt the need to shore up his credentials with the Polish electorate. Dmowski was in no sense pro-Russian, and his standing with the Polish population was unambiguous. So Dmowski had no need for any kind of Jewish scapegoat in order to protect his standing with the Poles. In addition, there was no need for making Jews into scapegoats when, unfortunately, Jews had already made themselves into scapegoats through their offensive, anti-Polish behavior.

ANTI-POLISH JEWISH SEPARATISM WAS OBJECTIONABLE NOT ONLY TO THE ENDEKS

The Endek-led boycott of the Jews, conducted in retaliation for Jewish conduct in the 1912 Duma elections, was only the beginning. Polonsky realizes that it was not only Endeks, political reactionaries, and devout Catholics, that came to see Jews as fundamentally incompatible with essential Polishness. (pp. 116-117). He thus concludes, (quote) The emergence of political anti-Semitism as a significant force in the Kingdom of Poland was primarily a consequence of the fear and anger provoked in Polish political circles by the growing strength of ethnic concepts of Jewish self-definition within the Jewish community of Poland. This view was succinctly put by Swietochowski himself. In his memoirs, he explained: “I admit only to the name of evolutionist in philosophy and national humanist in sociology. Because of my views, I defended the Jews fifty years ago, when they wished to be Poles, and because of the same views, I do not defend them today, when they wish to be Jews, enemies of the Poles.” (unquote)(p. 117).

JEWISH FREETHOUGHT: CARDINAL HLOND WAS RIGHT

Now consider the resurrected Poland (1918-1939). As is true of almost every work on Polish-Jewish relations, this one mentions Polish Cardinal August Hlond and his much-condemned 1936 statement on “Jews as freethinkers.” (pp. 226-227). Interestingly, however, the self-atheization of Poland’s Jews was an active concern not only to Polish Christians, but also to many Jews. Citing a Hebrew-language source, Polonsky writes, (quote) The impact of secularization was deeply worrying to the leaders of the Hasidic movement in Poland, both religious and lay, and they made great efforts to devise educational institutions that would protect their young people from what they regarded as the corrosive impact of the modern world and of secular Jewish ideologies, above all Bundism and Zionism. (unquote). (p. 246).

THE BUND: COMMUNISM, SEMANTICS, AND THE ZYDOKOMUNA

The author elaborates on Jewish political parties and movements. Consider the Bund. For a time, the Bund had effectively isolated itself from Jewish public opinion, in interwar Poland, because of what Polonsky calls its “resolutely anti-religious and anti-Zionist attitude”. (p. 232). By the late 1930’s, the Bund had grown into a widely supported Jewish political party in Poland. (pp. 232-233).

The author portrays the Bund as anti-Communist, notably in the light of onerous Soviet conduct (p. 216, 232), as well as advocating what Polonsky calls revolutionary socialism. (p. 232). But, semantics aside, what exactly is supposed to be the difference between “revolutionary socialism” and Communism? So, is the distinction between the Bund and Communism one of degree, anti-Stalinism, tactics, semantics, or some combination thereof?

JEWISH GERMANOPHILIA AT POLAND’S EXPENSE

The author elaborates on the strongly pro-German orientation of those Polish Jews that had fallen under Prussian rule because of the Partitions. (p. 2, 47, 54-55, 130).

THE ROOTS OF A POTENTIAL JEWISH-RULED POLAND

Although Polonsky does not mention Judeopolonia, he touches on it. The United Jewish Socialist Workers’ Party had been formed in 1917 by the merger of two parties, one of which called for the establishment of an autonomous Jewish territory, though not necessarily in Palestine. (p. 174). [Considering the large Jewish population in Poland, and the huge Jewish infrastructure already in place in Poland, why not make this Jewish province or state on Polish territory?]

THE JEDWABNE TRAP–YET AGAIN

Unfortunately, Antony Polonsky departs from his earlier relative objectivity, and veers to an outright Judeocentric bias, when he discusses such things as the events at Ejszyszki and the Jedwabne “revelation” of neo-Stalinist Jan T. Gross. Furthermore, Polonsky’s extensive bibliography conspicuously omits every single one of the scholarly works of historian Marek Jan Chodakiewicz. For instance, see: Intermarium: The Land between the Black and Baltic Seas, and read the detailed Peczkis review.