German DRANG NACH OSTEN in History Marvey

A Thousand Years of German Aggression, by S. M. Marvey. 1943

The DRANG NACH OSTEN: Age-Old German Designs on Poland

This small book is limited to German expansionism against the Slavic east, and doesn’t begin to do justice to the scope of proto-Nazi German thinking that existed long before Hitler. Nevertheless, this book is timely because of the recent tendency for German guilt dilution. For instance, Germans try to re-paint themselves as victims of WWII, to misrepresent the Nazi era as some sort of aberration, and to fulfill many aspects of age-old German imperial goals European Union. (No wonder that Polexit should seriously be considered).

MEDIEVAL GERMAN HANKERING AFTER POLISH TERRITORIES

Consider the early DRANG NACH OSTEN. Between the tenth and twelfth centuries, the Germans subjugated and eventually Germanized the indigenous Slavic tribes situated between the Elbe and Oder River: the Sorabs, Obodrites, and Luticians. (pp. 18-19). The next German move against Slavs was against west Pomerania. (p. 20-on).

German aggressors played on dissensions between Slavic leaders, made pretensions of peaceful intentions, etc. Later, in the decades before the Partitions, the Germans, no less than the Russians, exploited the power of the Polish nobility and the liberum veto in order to manipulate Poland to their advantage. (p. 77). [The perceptive reader may note the uncomfortable parallels with present-day corrupt Polish leaders, who are more interested in pleasing certain Jewish groups, and the European Union, than they are in defending Poland’s interests.]

THE TEUTONIC KNIGHTS

The Christian missionary work of the Teutonic Knights was a sham. (p. 40). They were a raw instrument of German aggression, pure and simple. The Knights distinguished themselves by their cruelties against the conquered, notably against the original Polish inhabitants of Gdansk (pp. 45-46), which they subsequently renamed Danzig.

The fruits of Polish successes against German aggression were not fully realized. The Polish-Lithuanian victory at Grunwald was not exploited to roll back previous German conquests. (p. 55). The peace of Torun (temporarily) weakened the Teutonic Order, but unfortunately was not used to put an end to its threat once and for all. (p. 61). [East Prussia was not to be liquidated until 1945, and may yet–heaven forbid–be revived in the form of erstwhile Soviet Germans being moved to its formerly Soviet-ruled part.]

GERMANY TEMPORARILY AT PEACE WITH POLAND–ONLY WHEN GERMANY WAS TEMPORARILY WEAK

German aggressive impulses against Poland in the 16th-17th centuries were inhibited by such things as the Thirty Years War and the power of Sweden and Denmark, etc. (pp. 76-on). The Partitions of Poland, which finally took place in the late 18th century at the initiative of Frederick II (p. 82), had been a pet German project for at least a century. (pp. 80-81). They had been temporarily held back by a Russian fear of too strong a Prussia.

FORCED GERMANIZATION OF GERMAN-CONQUERED PORTIONS OF PARTIONED POLAND

The de-Polonization of the conquered areas was effected by the strategic massive influx of German settlers. (p. 95). These German colonists were strengthened against the native Polish element by the likes of the Ostmarkenverein (Hakata). (p. 102).

The savage repression of the conquered Poles sunk to new depths under the Iron Chancellor. Bismarck even excused German aggression by comparing it to the natural predatory behavior of a wolf. (p. 98). His Kulturkampf was more a war against Polishness than against the church. Practically everything Polish was severely proscribed. Bismarck’s successor, Chancellor Bulow (Buelow) was even crueler. (p. 103).

POST-WWI GERMANY NEVER CAME TO TERMS WITH THE FACT OF THE RESURRECTED POLISH STATE

No sooner had the guns of WWI fallen silent than the Germans schemed renewed aggression. (pp. 107-on). The reader learns that Germany was honorably admitted to the League of Nations in 1926, and received foreign loans for strengthening its industry. Germany played pacifist, and the western European nations fell for it. Ironically, the Weimar republic was more overtly hostile to Poland than the Third Reich in its early stages. (p. 113). Marvey is perceptive in pointing out that (contrary to “the `injustices’ of Versailles having provoked Hitler to war” exculpation), Hitler had planned a war of aggression against the Slavic east already as far back as MEIN KAMPF. (p. 109). (Indeed! See the Peczkis review of MEIN KAMPF).