AntiSemitism Anders Army Bogus Kot

Conversations With the Kremlin and Dispatches From Russia, by Stanislaw Kot. 1963

Polish General Wladyslaw Anders Did NOT Say That “Jews are Poor Soldiers”. Stalin Did. Katyn Crime Begins to Emerge

Nazi Germany had suddenly attacked her erstwhile Soviet ally in 1941, though both had jointly conquered Poland in 1939. Now, Polish leaders were negotiating the release of the Polish deportees, and the creation of a Polish Army that would fight on the Soviet side against Germany.

A RATHER HALFHEARTED “AMNESTY”

This work records some of the conversations between Ambassador Stanislaw Kot, General Wladyslaw Anders, and Wladyslaw Sikorski, on one hand, and Andrei Vyshinsky, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Joseph Stalin on the other. One recurrent theme is the disorganized–perhaps halfhearted–release of the Polish captives, which lead to the suffering and death of very many “amnestied” Poles, and which made the formation of a Polish Army on Soviet soil increasingly untenable.

KATYN CRIME STARTS TO COME TO LIGHT

Part of the negotiations dealt with the fate of thousands of conspicuously missing Polish officers. (e. g, p. 51, 141-143, 177, 228, 229). Now the vagaries of release and wartime communication could explain the unknown whereabouts of some tens, perhaps a few hundred, officers, but not thousands of them. Only later did it turn out that the missing officers had long been murdered at Katyn and other locations.

The Soviet side insisted that no more than about 400,000 Poles had been deported in 1939-1941–a figure that was a fraction of other well-supported estimates. (p. 15, 40-41, 69, 96). For a recent study of this question, please read the detailed Peczkis review, of Polish Poetry from the Soviet Gulags: Recovering a Lost Literature.

POLAND’S NEW SOVIET “FRIEND”: NOT MUCH HAD CHANGED

Even though the USSR was now an “ally” of Poland, the Poles still had to deal with Communist propaganda. Thus, Kot pointed out that the characterization of Poland as a land of gentry (panow) was incorrect. Poland was actually a nation of peasants, workers, etc., and a democratic one. (p. 108). In addition, the plebiscite of late 1939 that legitimized the annexation of the Kresy by the Soviet Union was no more authoritative than the wartime plebiscites done by Hitler in the lands he had annexed. (p. 158). Finally, attempts to create a false symmetry between past Russian and Polish aggression, against each other, were just that. Kot quipped that Poles were in Moscow for only a few months, while the Russians had ruled over Poland for over a century. (pp. xxv).

POLAND’S POSTWAR ENSLAVEMENT: A FOREGONE CONCLUSION

What led to the sellout of Poland at Teheran and Yalta? Nowadays, we hear that England was behind a free Poland, and was only later forced to back down because of the geopolitical and military realities of the Soviet Union having done the bulk of the fighting against Nazi Germany, and the Red Army being in Poland. In contrast, Kot noted, in September 1941 (at a time when the defeat of the Soviet Union seemed likely), that England was already failing to support Poland against claims by the USSR. (p. xvi). Kot was also appalled by the fact that the West was supplying massive Lend Lease aid to the USSR without any conditions, and without so much as a draft statement of common aims and obligations for the future. (p. xvii). This could only embolden Stalin.

In a conversation between Stalin and Kot in November 1941, Stalin brought up Wanda Wasilewska, and his idea of forming a Soviet-serving Polish Army, a year earlier, before the German attack on Poland. (p. 115). Does this imply that Stalin was planning a Communist puppet government in Poland from the beginning, and that he at no time even considered a free, non-Communist one?

BAD SOLDIERS? THE OFT-MISQUOTED CONVERSATION ON JEWS

Here is the conversation in full: (Quote)

ANDERS. …I reckon on 150,000 men, i. e., eight divisions, together with auxiliary services. There may be even more of our people, but this includes a strong Jewish element which does not want to serve in the army.

STALIN. The Jews are rotten soldiers.

ANDERS. Many of the Jews who have applied to join are speculators or people who have been punished for smuggling; they will never make good soldiers. The Polish Army does not need these. Two hundred and fifty Jews deserted from Buzuluk on the false report that Kuibishev had been bombed. Over sixty deserved from the fifth division on the eve of an anticipated distribution of arms to the soldiers.

STALIN. Yes, the Jews are poor soldiers.

(A discussion follows. Stalin, Anders, and Panfilov take part, on the question of armaments and their shortages.)

(unquote). (All on page 153).

The facts are clear. Anders is talking about specific Jews and their specific misconduct, and never makes generalizations about Jewish soldiers in general. Stalin is the one who says, “Jews are poor soldiers”, and then keeps repeating this sweeping, pejorative generalization.

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA AGAINST POLES AND AGAINST JEWS

It turns out that the USSR was actively behind the propaganda that Anders’ Army is anti-Semitic, and that “Jews are poor soldiers”. In January 1942, Kot wrote, (quote) During the early days the position of the Jews in the Polish Armed Forces won some notoriety; it was the subject of observation by the Narcomvnudiel [NKVD] and the particular concern of Jewish foreign correspondents; the suggestion was spread about that Jews would not be able to find a satisfactory atmosphere and do service in the Polish Army because of Polish anti-Semitism. On the other hand, observations came from the Narcomvnudiel [NKVD] that the Jews were the worst element in the troops, cowardly and everlastingly dissatisfied, and that it would be desirable to get rid of this element. (unquote). (p. 182).

EVACUATING POLAND’S JEWS: THE SOVIET SUBTERFUGE

In a May 1942 cable message to the Polish Consulate in Jerusalem, Kot described how the Soviets are retaining Poland’s Jews, and then blaming it on the Poles, (quote). The levy commissions were exclusively Soviet in the field with a Polish delegate present, and on the spot rejected Jews, often tracing their heredity back to the grandmother or examining for circumcision. A second examination took place in our army, where the Narcomvnudiel [NKVD] delegate watched, and even those Jews who had been passed in the field were rejected. The same applied to Ukrainians, and Bielorussians [Byelorussians]. Even so, a large number of Jews were smuggled through under false names. While forbidding us to accept Jews, the Soviets simultaneously spread through their agents among the Jews the story that they were doing this on the demand of the Polish authorities. (unquote). (p. 229-230).

This charade continued. In June 1942, Vyshinsky told Kot that, for all practical purposes, there is no such thing as a Jew who is a Polish citizen. (p. 236; See also pp. 246-248).

Two leaders of the Jewish Socialist Bund, Alter and Ehrlich, were arrested by the Soviets and accused of espionage. Kot strongly but unsuccessfully intervened with Vyshinsky on their behalf. (p. 159, 200-201). The Soviets murdered them.

EARLIER JEWISH-SOVIET COLLABORATION

Stanislaw Kot described how Poland’s Jews were now being disabused of their illusions about Communism, and how many of them had, in 1939, supported the Soviet invaders of eastern Poland. [This is sometimes called the Zydokomuna]. Thus, while avoiding generalizations, Kot wrote, (quote) A certain proportion of the Jews behaved well as Polish citizens, a certain proportion and, as some declare, the majority, welcomed the entry of the Russian forces, and during the occupation co-operated fervently with the Soviet authorities, using unpleasant expressions concerning Polish statehood; and during the transportations and in the camps they sometimes caused trouble for the Poles. (unquote). (p. 185).

Even though Poles and Jews were now being reconciled in the Soviet Union, many Jews maintained their separatist mindset. Thus, the Zionists (following Jabotinsky) favored the formation of a separate Jewish Army fighting alongside the Polish Army. General Anders opposed this separatism. (p. 62, 102). (This would lead to the desertion, of many Jewish soldiers in the Polish Army, in Palestine.)