Poland’s Heroic Narrative Even Nazis Admired Iranek-Osmecki

The Unseen and the Silent: Adventures From the Underground Movement Narrated by Paratroops of the Polish Home Army, by Kazimierz Iranek-Osmecki. 1954

No “National Myths” or “Heroic Narrative”: The German Enemy Gives More Credit to the Polish Underground Than Do Many Jews and LEWAKS

The title of this book refers to the CICHOCIEMNI, a covert group of Polish soldiers in Britain who, after arduous training in parachute jumping, commando and guerilla tactics, etc., were parachuted-in into German-occupied Poland to reinforce the local Polish-guerilla Home Army (Armija Krajowa: AK, or A.K.). But this book is about more than that: It is an excellent history of the actions of the AK, notably that of Kedyw, its elite unit.

A SAMPLING OF POLISH GUERRILLA WARFARE

Intelligence-gathering was paramount. Iranek-Osmecki writes: “The Germans did their best to stamp out radio communications. Thanks to very accurate detectors, they located our transmitters very quickly, so that they had to be shifted and protected all the time by armed detachments. Whenever the Germans appeared, the covering detachment took the burden of defense upon itself, while the radio-telegraphist was supposed to save himself, taking with him the transmitting and receiving sets if at all possible.” (p. 70).

The author continues: “With the passage of time, as a German-Soviet front was established, and the German devastation of Poland became increasingly ruthless, the emphasis shifted from purely sabotage activities to fighting-sabotage, guerrilla, and large-scale Partisan warfare. This change was effected in the last months of 1942 and the first weeks of 1943.” (p. 77).

Attacks on German personnel and objectives had to be dictated by military significance as weighed against the German reprisal killings of Polish civilians that would follow. Only relatively prominent or exceptionally sadistic Germans were targeted for assassination. One of those assassinated was Schultz, a local Gestapo leader. (p. 124).

THE GERMAN CRACKDOWN

Iranek-Osmecki continues: “The autumn of 1943 was a particularly black period, during which the German authorities, by unprecedented acts of terrorism, mass executions, large-scale round-ups, and armed ‘pacifications’ of whole areas, tried to stamp out all resistance. The Home Army retaliated with intensified armed action of its own. Attacks on the railways were part of the reprisal campaign…destruction of military transports.” (p. 82). A number of successful de-railings of German trains are described.

POLISH INTELLIGENCE STEALS A V-2 ROCKET, AND SHIPS ITS CONTROL MECHANISM TO ENGLAND

Sometimes, the AK enjoyed spectacular success. One of these was the freeing of 60 imprisoned Polish guerillas at Konskie at a loss of only 3 Polish attackers. (p. 140). The Polish Underground monitored the German rocket program at Peenemunde (p. 162), leading to a successful British bombing attack on it. After the Germans moved their rocket program to Blizna in central Poland, the Underground monitored the rocket tests and stole the steering mechanism of a crashed rocket, which was subsequently flown to England. (pp. 167-171). This was part of Operation Wildhorn.

INCIPIENT COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

From the very beginning, the Polish Underground had to deal with Soviet perfidy. This included the denunciation of Polish guerillas to the Germans, killings of Polish-guerilla leaders, etc. A number of towns had developed self-defense units against banditry, and Soviet guerillas attacked them for this reason. At Naliboki, the Soviets murdered over a hundred civilians after taking the town, not during the combat itself. (p. 144). In the preface, Major-General Sir Colin Gubbins comments on what happened when Polish Underground leaders met with the Soviets to plan joint strategy against the Germans: “With a treachery rarely equaled in history, the Polish liaison parties were first welcomed with warmth, and then arrested and transported, never to be heard from since, or even in some cases ‘liquidated’ on the spot.” (p. x). Details are given of Operation Burza (“Tempest”) in Wolyn (Volhynia) and Wilno (Vilnius). The A.K. fought in support of the Red Army, only to be disarmed, or worse, soon thereafter by the Soviets.

NAZI GERMAN ENEMY GIVES MORE CREDIT TO POLISH GUERRILLAS THAN DO MANY JEWS AND LEWAKS

Nowadays, we hear a lot of not-so-subtle disparaging remarks about “Polish national mythologies” and the “Polish heroic narrative”, especially from certain Jews and the LEWACTWO. Even the German enemy knew better.

The greatest act of Soviet perfidy was the betrayal of the Warsaw Uprising, to which the book gives considerable detail. Most interesting are the comments of von dem Bach at the time of the Uprising’s surrender: “He was amazed by the efficiency of the Polish Underground, and its strength and universality. He said he could not understand how it had been possible to give Underground soldiers so thoroughly a training as the Home Army had received. The insurgents were the equals of the best regular troops he knew. He was greatly impressed by the accuracy of our snipers, who, he had told me, were the terror of the German units…” (p. 286).

Also: “In fact, he [von dem Bach] had been so struck by the things he had seen in Poland, the unification and solidarity of the whole population, the utter fearlessness and the powers of resistance—all impossible without the contribution of women—that he had reported them to Hitler at a special interview.” (p. 287). Finally: “He [von dem Bach] spoke about the valor of the Home Army, and said that the long defense of the inadequately armed insurgent troops against the experienced and well-tried German Army was unique in the history of war.” (pp. 291-292).

Incredible.