NSZ Saved Jews Bohun Dabrowski

Bylem Dowodca Brygady Swietokrzyskiej, by Antoni Bohun-Dabrowski. 2001

Polish Guerrilla Leader Tells How His “Anti-Semitic” Unit Saved a Large Group of Jewish Women From Being Burned Alive by the Germans

This action-packed memoir covers the prewar period, the 1939 campaign, guerilla actions in the region of Kielce, and the fascinating march across SW Czechoslovakia, ahead of the advancing Red Army, to a meeting with Patton’s Third Army.

POLAND HAD TWO ENEMIES, NOT ONE

The NSZ considered the Soviets an equal enemy with the Nazis, and opposed any fighting for them. The disarming of AK soldiers, the killing of their officers by the NKVD, and the betrayal of the Warsaw Uprising were taken as self-evident indicators of the folly (even criminality) of existing policies. (e. g., p. 58). (Barring hindsight, it isn’t so simple. Failure to fight the Germans on behalf of the Russians would’ve played into the hands of Communist propaganda, which insisted that non-Communist Poles aren’t really substantive participants in the anti-Nazi alliance, and have no significant standing among Poles. It would probably also have extinguished whatever slim chance there still existed for effective western support for a non-Communist Poland.)

JEWS IN COMMUNIST BANDS CHOSE TO MAKE THEMSELVES ENEMIES OF POLAND

Soviet-sponsored Communist GL-AL bands were well-armed, led by Russians, and of many nationalities (p. 65, 80-81). They regularly murdered AK and NSZ members (pp. 114-116), identified others to the Gestapo (p. 188, 192), robbed, raped, and killed Polish villagers (p. 109, pp. 127-128), and needlessly provoked German reprisals against local Poles. (p. 65). (Jewish involvement in the GL/AL, and in bandit bands, clarifies recurrent charges of the NSZ killing Jews).

The NSZ strategy was to fight only when it, or surrounding civilian populations, were in immediate danger from Germans, the GL/AL, or bandits. (p. 64, 73, 81). The goal was to conserve life in anticipation of Brigade participation in a future western-Soviet war. (p. 144, 173).

THE DOOMED SOVIET-BETRAYED WARSAW UPRISING (1944)

Polish guerillas could successfully attack German units in surprise attacks, but were insufficiently armed for sustained, open combat against them. The Commander correctly predicted that AK units would be unable to break through the German encirclement of Warsaw to aid the Uprising. (p. 79).

THE MUCH-UNAPPRECIATED SAVING LIVES OF JEWISH WOMEN

Ironic to accusations of the NSZ being anti-Semitic, it was singularly responsible for saving a few hundred Jewish women from certain death. This occurred on May 4, 1945 at a small women’s concentration camp near Holyszow (Holysov), located about 25 km SSW of Plzen (Pilsen). This was a subcamp of the Flossenburg concentration camp.

The barracks housing the Jewish women were surrounded by gasoline-filled cans, ready to be torched upon the approach of Allied armies. The Brigade took the camp by surprise (pp. 158-163), taking many Germans prisoner (p. 223), and freeing the 1,000 women of various nationalities (p. 151, 189). Later, the French government rewarded the Brigade for these heroics. (p. 259).

THE SOVIET UNION WANTS THE HEADS OF THE POLISH GUERILLAS

General Patton played a key role in preventing the Brigade from falling into the hands of the Soviets. (p. 225, 260). Fortunately, he didn’t share the rosy view of “Uncle Joe” Stalin then held by President Roosevelt.

The Communist smear campaign against the NSZ included–surprise–the media charge of it being fascist (p. 172), and this has been picked up by many Jewish memoirs that I have read. Accusations of NSZ-Nazi collaboration are falsehoods. During the westward march, agreements with German forces were purely of the nature of local truces (pp. 141-145), facilitated by the increasing German reluctance to die in a losing war against a strategically-dubious objective. The Brigade was allowed to march through the Czech Republic, not Germany. Pointedly, the Commander repeatedly refused German enticements for the Brigade to go back and fight behind Soviet lines. (p. 147, 149). In his memoirs, Mieczyslaw Moczar lied about the Commander begging the Germans to stop shooting at him (p. 235, 242).

The Communists didn’t stop with propaganda. After Germany’s defeat, they tried to kidnap or assassinate the Commander at least twice (pp. 178-179). Later, in 1950, they unsuccessfully framed him before a French court, trying to get him extradited as a war criminal merely for having fought against Communists. (p. 185).