Nobility Polish Serfdom Demystified Kieniewicz

The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry, by Stefan Kieniewicz. 1970

An Encyclopedic Gem: The Complex Nature of Serfdom in Poland and the End of It. Reciprocal Cause-Effect in Social Reform

Instead of listing the many individuals and events in this book, I focus on certain themes. In addition, I largely limit my review to the period before about 1865. The entire subject of serfdom requires a deep analysis, and one that is free from the narrow Marxist conception of class struggle that has dominated this subject.

INTRODUCTION

The author first defines his terms. (pp. 3-5). Thus, the folwark is the manorial farm. Panszczyzna means compulsory labor. (Many authors treat the term panszczyzna as the Polish translation of serfdom. Clearly, Kieniewicz does not consider them synonymous.) Thus, the peasant was sometimes allowed to forego forced labor (panszczyzna sensu Kieniewicz) in favor of selling his own crops and paying rent to the landlord. However, this lease instead of labor, by itself, did not end serfdom, as the rental arrangement existed at the discretion of the landlord, and he could return the peasant to compulsory labor at any time. (p. 12, 15).

Certain early reforms, such as allowing the peasant’s descendants to inherit the use of the land he was working on, did not by themselves end serfdom. They had no legal force, and could freely be abrogated by the landlord. (pp. 15-17).

Early reformers sought to soften, not eliminate, serfdom. Such was the case, for example, with Kosciuszko and his Polaniec Manifesto. (pp. 25-26).

WHAT EXACTLY WAS SERFDOM?

To Kieniewicz, the essence of serfdom was the peasant not having a legal right to own land. (p. 4). [Though not mentioned by the author, the crucial right of land ownership helps explain why many Soviet peasants later thought that Communism was actually a worse form of serfdom than the original feudalism. It also helps us understand why the famed kulaks fought so fiercely against the confiscation, of their land, that was part of the imposed Communist system of collective farming (the kolkhoz).]

The nature of serfdom, and the replacement of feudalism with capitalism, can be summarized as follows, (quote) All the land belonged to feudal masters–king, bishop or abbot, lord or gentleman, and occasionally a rich burgher. In this region of the exclusively large estates, all the arable land was divided into two parts: (1) the manorial farm, and (2) the village land, given in usufruct to individual peasants. The village land was meant to provide for the subsistence of the peasants; the manorial farm was tilled by the compulsory labor of the same peasants, working for the master…The disappearance of serfdom and panszczyzna did not end the division of land into manorial and village areas. It only changed the relationship between the two areas. The former serf, who had previously owed compulsory labor, now became an independent farmer, the owner of his land. The folwark became a capitalist enterprise run by hired labor. A new social class appeared on the countryside, almost unknown in the feudal epoch: the farmhands, the rural proletariat. (unquote). (pp. 4-5).

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: CAUSES AND EFFECTS CAN BE RECIPROCAL

Let us focus on the chicken and the egg. Do social classes cause social inequality, or does social inequality cause the emergence of social classes? Is social backwardness caused primarily by an unenlightened attitude, or do adverse economic conditions cause and maintain an unenlightened attitude and social backwardness? Conversely, does social change come from primarily from an enlightened attitude, or do improvements in the economic situation lead to an enlightened attitude, and the end of social backwardness?

ECONOMIC ISSUES AND THE EVENTUAL END OF SERFDOM

In addressing the economics of major aspects of serfdom, one should start with examples, in Poland, where serfdom did not fully develop, or did not exist at all, for precisely this reason. The very large estates (latifundia) did not use compulsory labor, as it would be inefficient. (p. 11). Therefore, landlords preferred that peasants sell their produce, and repay the landowners with rent instead of forced labor, because this was more profitable for the landlord. (p. 11). In the rich Crown-owned farms of the Zulawy district, and in those of the adjacent bishop-owned Warmia district, large farms were leased to peasants, and they only paid rent. (p. 9). In other areas with rich soil, the owners found it profitable to employ hired labor. (p. 10). Foreigners coming to live in Poland, and given land to develop, did not have to engage in compulsory labor, and paid rent instead. (p. 12). Finally, there was a category of farms owned by the Polish gentry, in which the gentry tilled it with their own hands, thereby qualifying as independent small farmers. (p. 10).

Conversely, in some parts of Poland, the folwark (manorial) system did not exist for precisely the opposite reason–the region was too poor to support the existence of manors. Peasants were usually paid for their work. (p. 9). In addition, manorial farms could come and go, in various regions of Poland, depending upon the economic situation.

Any switch from compulsory labor to rent was predicated on the fact that the local market was capacious enough to support it. (p. 13). Ironically, in some cases, peasants themselves preferred compulsory labor to rent because they could not sell their produce at economically viable prices to earn rent money. (p. 14). In other cases, as noted in the situation involving Count Andrzej Zamoyski (1800-1874), the peasants showed a lack of skill in managing their rental duties. (p. 99).

ECONOMICS DROVE THE PERSISTENCE OF SERFDOM AND ECONOMICS–RATHER THAN ENLIGHTENMENT–DROVE THE EVENTUAL ABOLITION OF SERFDOM

Early “experiments” in the abolition of major aspects of serfdom proved that it could be economically advantageous to all parties–if the level of local economic development could support it. This happened around 1740 in the Poznan area (p. 13), and, slightly later, near Wilno, by Father Pawel Brzostowski. He suppressed compulsory labor and manorial farms, and introduced village self-government complete with militia, schools, and hospitals. (p. 13). However, his successor reversed these reforms. (p. 15).

Clearly, serfdom and its persistence were governed by economics, and the steps in the eventual abolition of serfdom were also governed by economics. For instance, Stanislaw Staszic (1755-1826), a friend of the peasants in eighteenth century Poland, stated that a large-scale switch from compulsory labor to rent payment was not economically feasible (p. 11) and that outright peasant ownership of land was a form of justice and an ideal, but unfortunately largely a utopian one. (p. 21). Lelewel, and fervent democrat and friend of the peasant, stated that the drastic reform of the serf system, however immoral this system was, would ruin agriculture. (p. 104).

Once outright land ownership of peasants was being seriously considered, economic issues came to the fore. Thus, for instance, Adam Czartoryski preferred the Prussian model, in which only wealthy peasants would become proprietors, and these would have to reimburse the landlords for the property. (p. 104). Some landlords came to prefer rental payments, over compulsory labor, and even the outright granting of land ownership to peasants, because they thought that peasants would work harder for what is their own. (p. 151). [The same contention is used not only for capitalism vs. feudalism, but also capitalism vs. socialism.] In 1851 Thomas Potocki suggested that true conservatism did not consist of stubbornly defending outdated institutions, and that the economic shock of uwlaszczenie (granting land ownership to peasants) should be softened by an amortization through a bank, with part of the proceeds going to a communal fund for local self-improvement. (pp. 152-153).

All along, the overall low standard of living had been reinforcing the persistence of feudalism, and it long survived its demise. Thus, for example, agricultural machinery was rare in Galicia as late as 1910 (p. 210), and there was almost no schooling for peasants in Congress Poland as of 1863. (p. 187). As an aside, Konrad Proszynski (1851-1908) developed a primer, PROMYK PRIMER, for self-teaching literacy to peasants, and it later won first place in a competition in London for the best primer as the world. (p. 187).

THE INSURRECTIONS AND THE PEASANTRY

The author does not get into the subject of peasant national consciousness, but he does point out the Marxist origin of the notion that the peasantry was devoid of patriotic sentiments. (p. 85). He also rejects the claim that Polish peasants found both Poles and non-Poles to be oppressive, and thus did not care who ruled over them. As for the November 1830 Insurrection, peasants commonly served as soldiers, as they did elsewhere, but this itself did not inform on their level of national consciousness. (pp. 85-86).

Although Kieniewicz largely denies Austrian intrigue behind the 1846 jacquerie in Galicia, he realizes that rumors were earlier being promulgated (by whom?) that the szlachta was planning a slaughter of the peasants. (p. 121). In the 1848 revolution, specifically the Poznan insurrection, the Polish peasants showed a surprising flocking to the Polish banners, hatred of Germans, and willingness to vote Polish in elections. (p. 130).

As for the January 1863 Insurrection, volumes of data have been adduced to support the opposite premises–that the peasantry was indifferent to Poland’s struggle, and that it strongly supported it. (pp. 166-167). Kieniewicz takes the middle view. In addition, Polish leaders stressed the uwlaszczenie (which would culminate in the granting rights of land ownership to the peasantry). (p. 165-169). In 1864, the tsarist Russian authorities co-opted the “Polish model” of uwlaszczenie as their own, in order to undercut the Insurrection. (pp. 172-174).

SOME FORM OF CLASS STRUCTURE ALWAYS EXISTS—ONE WAY OR ANOTHER

When class differences disappear, new ones appear. Thus, among the emancipated peasantry in foreign-ruled Poland, by the late 19th century, large differences emerged between well-to-do and poor peasants. This was called rozwarstwienie. (p. 191, 213). [The informed reader can also think of the “new feudalism” of the kulaks, and poorer peasants, in pre-Revolutionary Russia. Later, under Communism and its professed total egalitarianism, there emerged new social classes, such as the “more equal” NOMENKLATURA and everyone else.]