Jews 1968 Ephemeral Poles Polonsky

Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry Volume 4: Poles and Jews: Perceptions and Misperceptions (Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry #4), by Antony Polonsky (Editor), Władysław Bartoszewski (Editor). 2004

Modern Polish Jews, Upon Leaving Poland, Very Soon Stop Being “Poles”. Egregious Mischaracterization of Endeks

This book offers disappointingly little that is substantive or original. The “perceptions” and “misperceptions” primarily deal with those of Poles towards Jews, but seldom the reverse. In addition, this work is weak on the causes behind the “perceptions” and “misperceptions.” I focus on a few items of interest

EVEN MODERN POLISH JEWS (1968) QUICKLY LOSE EVEN NOMIMAL POLISH IDENTIFICATION

How Polish are Polish Jews in recent times? Julian Ilicki studied a group of 2,500 mostly-educated and secularized Jews who had moved from Poland to Sweden. These Polish Jews had emigrated from Poland to Sweden in 1968-1972. The changes in their self-perception were surveyed in 1984. During that brief period of time (12-16 years), their self-identification as Jews rose from 65% to 68%. However, their self-identification as Poles plummeted from the 42% just before leaving Poland, through 31% just after arrival in Sweden, and down to only 17% in 1984. (p. 275).

One might contrast this with the Polish identity of ethnic Poles (e. g, Poles in the USSR). In some cases, they had maintained their Polish identity for generations!

The trend is striking. Does it support Dmowski’s premise that, even in the case of assimilated Jews, and moreover even in modern times, Polish Jews tend to have ephemeral loyalties to Poles and Poland?

POLES ANTI-SEMITIC ORIENTED, NOT ANTI-SEMITIC

The 1941 statement of General Grot-Rowecki, the Commander of the ARMIA KRAJOWA (A. K.), has widely been mistranslated as saying that “the overwhelming majority of the country is anti-Semitic.” What Growecki ACTUALLY said, as translated correctly by Roman Zimand (p. 339), was that “the overwhelming majority of the country is anti-Semitic oriented”. This implies that the anti-Semitism is not ingrained or fixed, and could change with time. [Furthermore, when Grot-Rowecki described this Polish mindset, the large-scale Jewish-Soviet collaboration was still an odious recent event.]

AN EGREGIOUS MISREPRESENTATION OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATS

British historian Norman Davies compares Polish nationalism with others’ nationalisms. There are several mischaracterizations of the National Democrats (Endeks), which I now correct. To begin with, Endek nationalism did not “exclude” others from Polish-ness. Rather, other peoples, through their own respective national developments, had already excluded themselves from Polishness. The Endeks then reciprocated this. The self-excluding peoples were especially the Jews and, to a lesser extent, the Ukrainians. Too many of these peoples, within a resurrected Poland, would only weaken her. Because of this, Dmowski opposed the restoration of Poland within her pre-Partition boundaries, either directly or in a Pilsudski-style federation. However, the Endeks always recognized the fact that members of other nationalities can sometimes become authentic Poles.

Davies suggests that the post-WWII situation in Poland was a synthesis of Marxism and Endek “ethnically-pure” thinking. (pp. 154-155). Any such correspondence is superficial. To begin with, the Endeks never suggested that Poland’s eastern boundary be situated as far west as what became to be known as the Curzon Line. In fact, the Endeks were willing to accept considerable mixed-population territories as part of Poland, as long as the local ethnic Polish minority was large, and the predominant overall culture was Polish. The Endek approach was thus a middle course between the extremes of “Where there are Poles there is Poland” (1772), and “Where there are ONLY Poles there is Poland” (1945).

In addition, Endek and Communist policies were diametrically opposite in motive. Endek policies, including those that favored a Polish state with small numbers of minorities, were designed, as noted previously, to strengthen Poland. Soviet policies were designed to weaken Poland–to reduce Poland to a tiny nation. Thus, post-WWII Poland was a rump state–essentially a repetition of Partition-era Russian-ruled Congress Poland, to which were added some German territories as “compensation”.

In addition, the clamor for Poland to have “ethnographic boundaries” (doubly ironic since the USSR was anything but ethnographically defined) was a cover for Russian imperialism. So was the corollary notion that the Belorussians and Ukrainians are just a branch of the Russian peoples, and that therefore territories having these peoples belong rightfully to Russia (tsarist or Soviet).

Davies goes as far as suggesting that Endek nationalism itself was an ironic copy of the Endek-hated German nationalism, including the BLUT and BODEN (Blood and Soil) variety. (p. 152, 157). This is frankly nonsense. German nationalism was a form of chauvinistic and racist thinking that disparaged others. Endek nationalism was not. It simply aimed at the preservation of Polish-ness. Prussianism, as well as BLUT and BODEN thinking, were forms of imperialistic and expansionistic nationalism. Endek nationalism was entirely different–a form of emancipatory nationalism. It stressed a Polish identity based on shared culture, history, and spiritual values, not one based on race or blood!