Jew Killing WWII By Poles Bogus Order Bor Komorowski

The Secret Army, by Tadeusz Bór Komorowski. 1984

The Falsehood of Commander Bor Komorowski Giving an Order For Poles to Kill Fugitive Jews. The Soviet-Betrayed Warsaw Uprising

Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski was, after the capture of Grot Rowecki by the Germans, the head of the entire AK (ARMIA KRAJOWA) Underground and guerilla movement in German-occupied Poland. Bor includes a detailed account of underground life and an impressive list of Polish sabotage actions against the German occupant (pp. 152-154). The AK was careful to calculate maximum benefit from its actions for the cost in German terror reprisals, but the Communist GL-AL had no such scruples (p. 171). The Communists only cared about acquiring power.

VARIOUS JEWISH AUTHORS FALSELY ACCUSED BOR-KOMOROWSKI OF A DISGUISED ORDER FOR POLES TO KILL FUGITIVE JEWS

The mendacity of certain Jewish authors knows no bounds: They would have us believe that “fighting banditry” was a cover for systematic Polish killing of fugitive Jews. As anyone who actually lived through the German occupation of Poland knows, banditry in the countryside, by non-Jews as well as Jews, was a very real problem.

The facts are unambiguous. German despoiling policies had turned the Polish countryside into anarchy: “…there grew up a new category of `forest folk’. They were wild bands of all sorts of refugees living by robbery, and were a terrible plague to people in the neighborhood, who were visited nearly every night by bandits, who gradually deprived them of their last belongings…I issued orders to the regional Home Army commanders to undertake the defense of the population against the violence of disturbing elements.” (pp. 171-172). It is easy to see how fugitive Jews would fall victim to these bandits and, to the extent that they themselves engaged in banditry, would be targeted by the AK. It is not more complicated than that.

THE MYTH OF POLES DISRESPECTING THE JEWS’ EARLIER 1943 WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING

One common Polonophobic meme is that of Polish contempt for the Jews’ Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, as supposedly manifested by Poles going to Easter Mass within sight and smell of the burning Ghetto and its tormented Jews.

Now, when Masses were said during the Poles’ own Warsaw Uprising in 1944, both priests and parishioners were oblivious to the bombs and shells exploding around them (p. 335). Now, if the Easter masses performed during the earlier Warsaw Ghetto Uprising had signified Polish callousness towards Jewish suffering (as portrayed in Holocaust materials), then, using the same logic, were these new Polish Masses signifying disrespect of suffering Poles during their own Uprising?

THE GERMANS DID SEEK HIGH-LEVEL POLISH COLLABORATORS, EVEN LATE IN WWII, AND STILL WITHOUT SUCCESS

Finally, Bor’s own experience adds to the refutation of the silly “No Polish Quisling because the Germans never wanted one” argument. After surrendering to the Germans, Bor was repeatedly approached by German officials intent on him creating a collaborationist army (pp. 374-375, 380-381, 383, 386-387). He steadfastly refused.

THE SOVIET-BETRAYED WARSAW UPRISING AGAINST IMPOSSIBLE ODDS

Having been its commander, Bor-Komorowski gives full details of the betrayed Warsaw Uprising: the frightful German atrocities, the barricades, the child messengers, the struggle against starvation, the overwhelming German firepower (e. g., the Nebel Werfer “roaring cow”, p. 254), the improvised hospitals, the massive evacuations through sewers, etc.

SUCCESSIVE ACTS OF SOVIET PERFIDY TOWARDS THE WARSAW UPRISING

Soviet betrayal was consistent and unfolding, guaranteeing the doom of the Uprising.
First the Soviets complained that the AK wasn’t interested in fighting the Germans. Then they changed their tune: They urged the Varsovians to rise up. Then they denied the existence of any Warsaw Uprising. Then they called the Uprising a criminal adventure, etc. The Soviets then toyed with the Poles by belatedly taking east-bank Warsaw (Praga), all the while intercepting and disarming AK units marching towards Warsaw to assist the Uprising.

Token Soviet airdrops were eventually undertaken–but without parachutes so that the goods would be useless. Towards the end of the Uprising, once its doom was certain and very little of Warsaw was still held by Poles (so most airdrop supplies were certain to fall into German hands), Stalin finally allowed western airplanes to refuel on Soviet-held soil after dropping their supplies.

The exculpatory notion that the Soviet forces were in no position to render effective ground assistance to the Poles is ridiculous on its face. The Red Army positions and those of the AK came within 250 yards (230 meters) of each other (p. 341, 354); the width of the draught-shrunken Vistula. Previously, the Red Army had readily crossed the thaw-widened lower Dnieper, three times the width of the Vistula River (p. 341).

This time, however, Stalin wouldn’t let the Red Army budge until long after the fall of the Uprising and the subsequent complete destruction of Warsaw by the vindictive, genocidally-minded Germans.

UNDESERVED POLISH-COMMUNIST CREDIT FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE WARSAW UPRISING

After WWII, the Soviet-imposed Communist government, unable to suppress knowledge about the Warsaw Uprising, instead tried to co-opt it as the work of militant Communists. Their involvement had been trivial. The Communist GL-AL fielded 5 platoons compared with over 600 participating AK platoons (p. 259).