1939 War Poland Betrayed German General Manstein Condemns

Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General, by Erich von Manstein, B.H. Liddell Hart (Foreword by), Martin Blumenson (Introduction). 2004

The 1939 German Conquest of Poland, and the West’s Unexpected Betrayal. The German Enemy Showed More Respect For Poland Than Did the French and British Allies. For Shame

Rather than repeating other reviewers, I focus mostly on previously-unmentioned content. Owing to the volume of information available, I largely limit my review to the 1939 war.

GERMAN IMPERIALIST PLANS AGAINST EUROPE

In his discussion of pre-WWII events, von Manstein presents himself as a typical German chauvinist when he makes revisionist complaints about Poland having received German territories “to which neither historical justice nor the right of self-determination gave her any claim.” (p. 24). He conveniently forgets that these “German” territories had gotten that way as a result of centuries of German conquests and Germanization policies, the latter of which had become especially intense in only the last several decades before WWII. If only recent events count, then Manstein’s “self-determination” complaints ring hollow in the light of the fact that, after the 1918-era plebiscites, certain border areas whose inhabitants had majority-voted to be part of the resurrected Polish state nevertheless had remained part of Germany.

TRYING TO WHITEWASH HITLER

Several reviewers have mentioned Manstein’s denials of German WWII atrocities. Indeed! Manstein would have us believe that Hitler’s annihilate-Poles order had been misrepresented at Nuremberg, and that the Fuhrer had only been referring to the annihilation of the Polish Army. (p. 29). What a ridiculous apologetic! Hitler had plainly ordered his forces to: “Kill without mercy every man, woman, and child of Polish extraction.” So, unless the Fuehrer had been imbued with the notion that the Polish Army was full of women and children, he had to be referring to the deliberate genocide of Polish civilians.

THE BZURA COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Unlike the case in later battles, Hitler didn’t interfere in the actual military policies of the 1939 war. (p. 273). The German tanks moved so rapidly that the German infantry had difficulty keeping up with them. (p. 54). The Polish Bzura counteroffensive, though later dwarfed by Soviet battles, was the largest of its kind up to that time. (p. 58).

THE GERMAN ENEMY PAYS TRIBUTE TO POLISH GALLANTRY

Summarizing the 1939 campaign, the Field Marshall commented: “The enemy’s losses in blood were undoubtedly very high indeed, for he had fought with great gallantry and had shown a grim determination to hold out in even the most hopeless situations.” (p. 61).

SHOULD THE POLISH FORCES HAVE TRIED TO DEFEND A SMALLER TERRITORY?

In common with many analysts, Manstein contended that the rapidity of Poland’s military defeat stemmed primarily from her strategy of “defending everything”—a mistake later made by Hitler himself. (p. 40, 43, 495, 522). Poland should have defended only her core territories, thereby shrinking the defensive perimeter from 1,125 miles to 375 miles. (p. 42). (However, Manstein doesn’t mention the fact that, among other things, Polish leaders feared that the abandoning of Poland’s peripheral regions without a fight would be interpreted by the Allies as a lack of seriousness in Polish military efforts. This could give the British and French an excuse for not fulfilling their treaty obligations to Poland [which they did not fulfill anyway]).

POLAND IS OPENLY BETRAYED BY HER PRESUMED ALLIES IN 1939: GENERAL MANSTEIN PLAINLY SAYS SO

Over and over again, Manstein repeated how gravely he and other German planners took the British and French military guarantees to Poland. (p. 23, 34-35, 46, 58). Contrary to revisionists who assert that France was unprepared for action, Manstein cited a study by von Tippelskirch, which noted how France had raised 108 divisions in only three weeks in the autumn of 1939, including many that consisted of well-armed, well-trained reservists. He concluded: “There can be no doubt, then, that the French Army far outnumbered Germany’s forces in the west from the very first day.” (p. 35). Even as the last organized Polish resistance was collapsing, German troops were hurriedly being moved westward out of fear of a belated French-British offensive, which, to the German leaders’ admitted surprise, had not materialized long before then. (p. 58).

POLAND’S 1939 FATE WAS FAR FROM HOPELESS

Pointedly, Manstein believed that, had the French intervened, and had the Polish forces been defending the smaller perimeter, Poland actually stood a chance: “The bravery with which the Polish troops fought right up to the end would have been an adequate guarantee of their ability to hold on until the Allies reached the Rhine and forced the German command seriously to consider calling off the campaign in Poland.” (p. 62).

THE GERMAN ENEMY SHOWS MORE RESPECT FOR POLAND THAN THE BRITISH OR FRENCH. FOR SHAME!

The German enemy, as embodied by Manstein, showed more respect for Poland than did the Allies when he asked: “Who could have guessed that the Western Powers would let Poland down so ignominiously after giving her a guarantee?” (p. 81). Excellent question!

THE OUN-UPA AND THE GERMANS

Fast forward to 1944, and Manstein’s stay near Lwow (Lviv), shortly before he was recalled. He characterized the local guerilla forces as follows: “The Soviet variety fought against the Germans and terrorized the local population. The Ukrainians fought the Soviet partisans, but usually released any Germans after first disarming them. Finally, there were bands of Polish partisans who fought both Germans and Ukrainians.” (p. 532). Obviously, the OUN-UPA, when not collaborating with the Germans, had less enmity against them than against the Soviets (and Poles).