1939 War Myths Cavalry Charging Tanks Zaloga

Poland 1939: The birth of Blitzkrieg, by Steven J. Zaloga, Ramiro Bujeiro (Illustrator), Howard Gerrard (Illustrator). 2002

Poland’s Defense Against Nazi Germany’s Aggression, Against Impossible Odds, and Furthermore While Betrayed by Her French and British Allies. The Immortal Polish Cavalry Charging German Tanks Canard

There are several good reviews of this book in existence, and I focus my review mostly on details not covered by them. This review is based on the 2004 hardback edition.

NO COMPARISON BETWEEN GERMANY’S AND POLAND’S MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES

Industrial capacity is the key to modern warfare, and the extreme asymmetry (using modern parlance, and not Zaloga’s) favoring the Germans began at that stage. Up to WWII, Germany had manufactured 1.4 million motor vehicles against Poland’s 33,000 (p. 32). Germany was in a position to outspend Poland, in military matters, at 30:1 (p. 22), despite Herculean efforts by the latter.

Nominal static asymmetry in such things as airplanes, tanks, and artillery favored the Germans at approximately between 4:1 to 8:1 (p. 23, 31). But, since German weapons were more modern, the effective static asymmetry was easily 10:1 or more. Since only 65% of Polish forces had been fully mobilized (p. 39: as a result of western pressure for Poles not to “provoke” Hitler), the effective static asymmetry became even greater. Finally, owing to the fact that the German forces enjoyed greater mobility and modern communication (e. g., p. 32, 67, 70), they could use their arms more effectively than the Poles could whatever little they had. Owing to these tactical advantages, the dynamic asymmetry favoring the Germans became much greater than the effective static asymmetry already in their favor.

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE WELCH ON THEIR TREATY OBLIGATIONS TO POLAND

Zaloga discusses the failure of the British and French to live up to their treaty obligations towards Poland in 1939: “Hitler had hoped that Britain and France would abandon Poland altogether. Their timid response left the Poles to their fate. France threw away one of its great strategic opportunities, as German forces in the west were too thin to repulse any full-scale assault. German officers interviewed about the campaign after the war expressed their firm belief that if France had struck with force in September 1939, its army would have reached the Rhine in a couple of weeks, and possibly won the war. France would have faced a far different army in 1939 than the one it confronted a year later.” (p. 65)

THAT IMMORTAL TALE OF POLISH CAVALRY TAKING ON GERMAN PANZERS

Ironic to the “Polish lancers charging German tanks” canard, the Polish cavalry had actually discontinued the use of lancers well before WWII (p. 7, 30)! Zaloga traces the origins of the German-propaganda tale (pp. 42-43), which unfortunately has proved to be so enduringly believed. (Myths survive when they meet needs. This one fulfilled the need of Poles to remember their struggle against a vastly technologically superior foe. It also met the needs of Polonophobes, as it ostensibly supported their prejudicial views of Poles as impetuous, stupid, and otherwise unworthy of having an independent nation-state.)