1939 War German General Credits Poles Guderian

Panzer Leader, by Heinz Guderian, B.H. Liddell Hart (Foreword by), Kenneth John Macksey (Introduction). 2001

Nazi-Soviet Alliance Was Real. Nazi German General Gives Credit to Poles. Warsaw Uprising Betrayed. Hitler 1944 Bomb Plot Had No Chance of Success

This book touches on several important issues, which I discuss:

THE 1939-1942 MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT HAD BEEN REAL AND SUBSTANTIVE

Guderian recognizes the fact that the Soviet Communist alliance with the Third Reich had not been simply an innocent, time-stalling tactical move: “On September 29th, 1939, Russia signed a pact of friendship with Germany and at the same time made a trade agreement that was of considerable value to the Germans in the economic prosecution of the war.” (p. 140).

A HOARY 1939 WAR MYTH REPEATED

Guderian claims that the Pomorska Cavalry Brigade charged German tanks with lances, “in ignorance of the nature of our tanks” (p. 72). This contrasts with western accounts, which blame Polish impetuousness and foolhardiness for this supposed act. In actuality, the Polish cavalry had discontinued the use of lances well before WWII (see the Peczkis review of Poland 1939: The Birth Of Blitzkrieg (Campaign)).

THE GERMAN ENEMY GAVE MORE CREDIT TO THE POLISH ARMY THAN DO MANY WESTERNERS

Otherwise, General Guderian shows more respect for the much-maligned 1939 Polish Army than did the British and Americans. “The first serious fighting took place…the leading tanks found themselves face to face with Polish defensive positions. The Polish anti-tank gunners scored many direct hits.” (p. 70). He writes of the “fierce battles for Warsaw” (p. 84), and characterizes the Poles as “a tough and courageous enemy.” (p. 73).

INDIRECT EVIDENCE FOR THE SOVIET BETRAYAL OF THE POLES’ 1944 WARSAW UPRISING

General Heinz Guderian mentions the losses which the Germans had just inflicted on the Red Army. (p. 359). (This setback has been distorted by Soviet apologists into proof that the Red Army was thereby immobilized, and thus unable to aid the Warsaw insurgents.) To begin with, Guderian was referring to the period around August 1, 1944–certainly not the entire 5.5 months that the Red Army sat idly on the eastern bank of the Vistula. Moreover, Guderian’s information is instructive. Throughout the first half of 1944 (in what includes Operation Bagration), the Red Army had been routing the Germans with its “considerable superiority in strength” (p. 327), causing the total destruction of 25 German divisions (p. 336). Then, on the outskirts of Warsaw, the Soviet apologists would have us believe, the Red Army suddenly and conveniently lost all its strength for 5.5 months (August 1, 1944–January 12, 1945), only to magically regain it (and more) in the form of a 20:1 advantage in guns and 7:1 advantage in tanks, after the Uprising. (p. 382).

KAMINSKI WASN’T EXECUTED FOR HIS CRIMES TO POLES

Guderian claims credit for talking Hitler into recognizing the Warsaw combatants as regular soldiers (p. 356)–otherwise they wouldn’t surrender knowing that the Germans would kill them all anyway. He mentions the frightful atrocities of the Dirlewanger and Kaminski units. Against the impression that Bach Zelewski had executed Kaminski for his crimes against Poles, and as a matter of principle, we find that nothing so noble was at work: “Von dem Bach took the precaution of having Kaminski shot and thus disposed of as a potentially dangerous witness.” (p. 356).

THE 1944 HITLER BOMB PLOT WAS FOREDOOMED, EVEN IF HITLER HAD DIED

The much-romanticized Hitler bomb plot never had a chance (pp. 344-345). There was no means of destroying the many pro-Hitler leaders. And, when Stauffenberg flew into Berlin with his mistaken announcement that Hitler was dead, he found no significant following.